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Abstract
We present an analysis of the time behavior of the S&P500 (Standard and Poors)
New York stock exchange index before and after the October 1987 market crash
and identify precursory patterns as well as aftershock signatures and characteristic
oscillations of relaxation. Combined, they all suggest a picture of a kind of dynamical
critical point, with characteristic log-periodic signatures, similar to what has been
found recently for earthquakes. These observations are confirmed on other smaller
crashes, and strengthen the view of the stockmarket as an example of a self-organizing
cooperative system.
Re´sume´
Nous pre´sentons une analyse du comportement de l’indice boursier americain S&P500
avant et apre`s le crash d’octobre 1987. Nous identifions des motifs pre´curseurs ainsi
que des oscillations de relaxation et des signatures de re´pliques apre`s le crash. Ces car-
acte´ristiques sugge`rent toutes ensembles que ce crash peut eˆtre vu comme une sorte
de point critique dynamique, posse´dant des signatures spe´cifiques log-pe´riodiques,
comme on l’a de´couvert pre´ce´demment pour les tremblements de terre. Ces obser-
vations sont confirme´s sur d’autres crashes plus petits et renforcent le concept d’un
marche´ mondial vu comme un exemple de syste`me auto-organise´ complexe.
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1 The October 1987 crash
From the opening on October 14, 1987 through the market close on October 19,
major indexes of market valuation in the United States declined by 30 percent or
more. Furthermore, all major world markets declined substantially in the month,
which is itself an exceptional fact that contrasts with the usual modest correlations
of returns across countries and the fact that stock markets around the world are
amazingly diverse in their organization [1].
In local currency units, the minimum decline was in Austria (−11.4%) and the
maximum was in Hong Kong (−45.8%). Out of 23 major industrial countries [2], 19
had a decline greater than 20%. Contrary to a common belief, the US was not the first
to decline sharply. Non-Japanese Asian markets began a severe decline on October
19, 1987, their time, and this decline was echoed first on a number of European
markets, then in North American, and finally in Japan. However, most of the same
markets had experienced significant but less severe declines in the latter part of the
previous week. With the exception of the US and Canada, other markets continued
downward through the end of October, and some of these declines were as large as
the great crash on October 19.
A lot of work has been carried out to unravel the origin(s) of the crash, notably
in the properties of trading and the structure of markets; however, no clear cause
has been singled out. It is noteworthy that the strong market decline during October
1987 followed what for many countries had been an unprecedented market increase
during the first nine months of the year and even before. In the US market for
instance, stock prices advanced 31.4% over those nine months. Some commentators
have suggested that the real cause of October’s decline was that over-inflated prices
generated a speculative bubble during the earlier period.
However, the analysis on univariate associations and multiple regressions of these
various factors which have been carried out [1] conclude that it is not clear at all
what was the origin of the crash. The most precise statement, albeit somewhat
self-referencing, is that the most statistically significant explanatory variable in the
October crash can be ascribed to the normal response of each country’s stock market
to a worldwide market movement. A world market index was thus constructed [1]
by equally weighting the local currency indexes of 23 major industrial countries [2]
and normalized to 100 on september 30. It fell to 73.6 by October 30. The im-
portant result is that it was found to be statistically related to monthly returns in
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every country during the period from the beginning of 1981 until the month before
the crash, albeit with a wildly varying magnitude of the responses across countries
[1]. This correlation was found to swamp the influence of the institutional market
characteristics. This signals the possible existence of a subtle but nonetheless present
world-wide cooperativity.
In addition, we also note the highly nonlinear (threshold like) behavior of traders,
following positive and negative feedback patterns [3]. This, in addition to these
above facts and the preliminary understanding of market self-organization provided
by simple statistical models [3], lead us to ask whether the October 1987 crash could
not be the result of a worldwide cooperative phenomenon, with signatures in analogy
with critical phase transitions in physics. Here scale invariance and self-similarity
are the dominant concepts, which have proven extremely useful in non-equilibrium
driven systems, such as earthquakes, avalanches, crack propagation, traffic flow to
mention a few.
2 Evidence for cooperative behavior and log-
periodic oscillations
2.1 Precursory pattern
Fig.1 shows the evolution as a function of time of the New York stock exchange index
S&P500 from July 1985 to the end of 1987. The crosses represent the best fit to a
constant rate hypothesis corresponding to an average return of about 30% per year.
This first representation does not describe the apparent overall acceleration before
the crash, occurring already more than a year in advance. This acceleration (cusp-like
shape) is represented by the monotonic line corresponding to a fit of the data by an
pure power law:
Fpow (t) = A1 +B1 (tc − t)
m1 , (1)
where tc denotes the time at which the powerlaw fit of the S&P500 presents a diverg-
ing slope, announcing an imminent crash. Since the ”noise” content of S&P500 is
not known, a χ2-statistic cannot be calculated in order to qualify the fit. Instead, we
have used the variance of the fit defined as var (f) = 1
N−n
∑N
i=1 (yi − f (ti))
2, where
n is the number of free variables in f . (This assumes that the errors are normally
distributed, which is a reasonable null-hypothesis.) The ratio of two variances corre-
sponding to two different hypothesis is now the qualifying statistic. For the constant
rate hypothesis to that of the power-law, we find a ratio varexp/varpow ≈ 1.1 indicat-
3
ing a slightly better performance of the power law in capturing the acceleration, the
number of free variables being the same (2).
However, already to the naked eye, the most striking feature in this accelera-
tion is the presence of systematic deviations. Inspired by the analogy with critical
phenomena, we have fitted this structure by the following mathematical expression
Flp (τ) = A2 +B2 (τc − τ)
m2 [1 + C cos (ω log (τc − τ))] , (2)
where τ = t/T is the time in units of T and we use natural logarithm. The time
scale T comes about because the cosine is expected to have some phase Ψ defined
by cos (ω log (tc − t)− ψ). We can always change variable with Ψ = ω log T , which
allows us to retrieve the notation used in Eq.(2). This shows that the phase Ψ is
therefore nothing but a time scale. This equation is the first Fourier component of a
general log-periodic correction to a pure power law for an observable exhibiting a cusp
singularity at the time tc of the crash, i.e. which becomes scale-invariant at the critical
point [4]. Eq. (2) was first proposed to fit experimental measurements of acoustic
emissions prior to rupture of heterogeneous composite systems stressed up to failure
[5]. It has also been observed to fit the dependence of the released strain on the time
to rupture for various large Californian earthquakes and the seismic activity of the
Aleutian-Island seismic zone [4] as well as precursors to the recent Kobe earthquake
in Japan [6]. Beside, ‘complex exponents’ (i.e. log-periodic corrections to power laws)
have recently been found in a variety of physical systems which constitute paradigms
of self-organization and complexity [7]. On a theoretical ground, they reflect the
fact that the system is invariant under a discrete (rather than continuous) set of
dilatations only. While having been ignored for a long time, it seems that complex
exponents and their accompanying log-periodic patterns are actually very common
in Nature.
The Log-periodic corrections to scaling imply the existence of a hierarchy of char-
acteristic time intervals tc− tn, determined from the equation ω log(tc− tn)+T = npi,
which yields tc − tn = τ0λ
n, with λ = exp pi
ω
, τ0 = λ
−
T
pi . For the October 1987 crash,
we find λ ≃ 1.5− 1.7 (this value is remarkably universal and is found approximately
the same for other crashes and earthquakes) and τ0 ≃ 0.85− 0.95 years. We expect
a cut-off at short time scales (i.e. above −n ∼ a few units) and also at large time
scales due to the existence of finite size effects. These time scales tc− tn are not uni-
versal but depend upon the specific market. What is expected to be universal are the
ratios tc−tn+1
tc−tn
= λ. These time scales could reflect the characteristic relaxation times
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associated with the coupling between traders and the fundamentals of the economy.
The fit was performed as a minimization of the variance varlp, defined above, of the
data. For the three linear variables A2, B2, C, the minimization of the variance yields
a set of three linear equations which can be solved analytically, thus determining A2,
B2 and C as functions of the four nonlinear variables m, tc, ω and T . After this first
step and replacing the analytical formulas of the linear variables A2, B2 and C in the
expression of the variance, we get a 4-parameter fit where the remaining unknown
variables are m, tc, ω and T . We claim this corresponds indeed to a 4-parameter fit
(and not to a 7-parameter fit) since we have used an analytical constraint (here the
minimization of the variance) to eliminate 3 unknown variables. This is completely
similar, say, to the fit of a probability distribution presenting a priori two unknown
variables, the normalizing factor C and a characteristic decay rate µ (Ce−µx for
an exponential distribution), in which the condition of normalization to 1 of the
probability distribution imposes C = µ leading actually to a 1-parameter fit. In
addition, we checked that the results are independent of the time unit used (which
controls the T variable). This was done by using either time measured in days from
the first point in the fit and also performing the fit with decimal years counting from
the turn of the century, giving exactly the same value for m, tc, ω, implying that we
face in fact an effective 3-parameter (m, tc, ω) fit. Moreover, these three parameters
m, tc and ω are the most physically relevant, two of these (m and ω) being expected
to exhibit some universality as discussed previously within the renormalization group
framework [4, 5, 7].
Due to the “noisy” nature of the data and the fact that we are performing a
minimization of the variance with respect to the four remaining non linear parameters
m, tc, ω and T , the 5-dimensional space of the varlp as a function of m, tc, ω and T
has in general several local minima. Hence, a preliminary restricted search (so-called
Taboo search [8]) was performed before the full 4-parameter fit was executed, ensuring
that the global minimum was found. This search was done on a grid paving the two-
dimensional space (tc, ω): for each given couple (tc, ω), we minimize the variance
with respect to the two other parameters and plot the resulting variance as a function
of tc and ω. Finding the local minima of the variance on this grid, we then launch a
simplex algorithm on the four non linear parameters m, tc, ω and T . The estimation
of the position of the critical time tc is found within a few days from the actual crash
time and the critical exponent m is m2 = 0.33. The ratio between varlp and that of
the two other hypothesis is more than a factor of 3, which very clearly establishes Flp
5
as the best performing fit among the three proposed.
We also scanned regions without crashes to ascertain the absence of significant
log-periodic fluctuations there.
2.2 Aftershock patterns
If the concept of a crash as a kind of critical point has any value, we should be able
to identify post-crash signatures of the underlying cooperativity. In fact, we should
expect an at least qualitative symmetry between patterns before and after the crash.
In other words, we should be able to document the existence of a critical exponent as
well as log-periodic oscillations on relevant quantities after the crash. We have found
such a signature in the variance (not to be confused with the variance of the fit) of
the S&P500 index, implied from the S&P500 options.
The term ”implied variance” has the following meaning. To understand what it
means, one must first recall what is an option: this financial instrument is nothing
more than an insurance that can be bought or sold on the market to insure oneself
against unpleasant price variations [9]. The price of an option on the S&P500 index
is therefore a function of the variance (so-called volatility) of the S&P500. The more
volatile, the more fluctuating, the more risky is the S&P500, the more expensive is
the option. In other words, the price of an option on the market reflects the value of
the variance of the stock as estimated by the market with its offer-and-demand rules.
In practice, it is very difficult to have a good model for market price volatilities or even
to measure it reliably. The standard procedure is then to see what the market forces
decide for the option price and then determine the implied volatility by inversion of
the Black and Scholes formula for option pricing [10, 9].
Fig.2 presents the time evolution of the implied variance of the S&P500 index
after the crash, taken from [11]. As expected, the variance decreases dramatically
after the crash, while exhibiting characterizing log-periodic oscillations.
Note the long time scale covering a period of the order of a year involved in the
relaxation of the volatility after the crash to a level comparable to before the crash.
We also note that the S&P500 index as well as others worldwide have remained
around the immediate of the crash level for a long time. For instance, by Febru-
ary 29,1988, the world index stood at 72.7 (reference 100 on September 30, 1987).
Thus, the price level established in the October crash seems to have been a virtually
unbiased estimate of the average price level over the subsequent months. Note also
that the present value of the S&P500 index is much larger than it was even before
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the october 1987 crash, showing again that nothing fundamental happened then. All
this is in support of the idea of a critical point, according to which the event is an
intrinsic signature of a self-organization of the markets worldwide.
Our analysis with eq.(2), with tc − t replaced by t− tc gives again an estimation
of the position of the critical time tc, which is found within a few days. The critical
exponent is now m2 = −1.2. The ratio of varlp to varpow and varexp, respectively, is
≈ 2, the power law again performing slightly better than an exponential relaxation
hypothesis.
We have found another striking signature of the cooperative behavior of the US
market by analyzing the time evolution of the S&P500 index over a time window of
a few weeks after the October 19 crash. A fit shown in Fig.3 with a exponentially
decaying sinusoidal function suggests that the US market behaved, during a few
weeks after the crash, as a single dissipative harmonic oscillator. We think that this
signature strengthens the view of a market as a cooperative self-organizing system,
presenting powerlaw distributions, large events in possible coexistence with synchro-
nized behavior. Such properties have been indeed documented recently in models with
threshold dynamics showing the generic coexistence between critical self-organization
and a large ’avalanche’ regime corresponding to synchronization of threshold oscilla-
tors [12]. For the October 19, 1987 crash, we find that the characteristic decay time
as well as the period of the oscillations are about a week.
3 Discussion
We have found evidence of log-periodic structures in several others crashes in a variety
of markets [13], paralleling previous similar observations on earthquakes [4, 5, 6]. We
suggest that this reflects the fundamental cooperative nature of the behavior of stock
markets. In general, cooperative behaviors in complex systems cannot be reduced
to a simple decomposition on elementary causes, in agreement with the observation
[1] that no single source [14] has been identified as a key factor in the October 1987
crash. One must rather look from a more global view point in which the crash can
emerge ”naturally” as an intrinsic signature of the functioning of the market.
To rationalize these observations, we will report elsewhere [13] on a simple model
of stockmarket speculation leading to a crash based on the existence of positive feed-
back interactions in which traders exchange information according to a hierarchical
structure. This structure is intended to model the organization of the market in the
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world, where at the highest level of the hierarchy, we find the “currency and trading-
blocks” (Yen, US$, D-mark, ...), at the level immediately below we have countries,
at the level below the major banks and institutions within a country, at the level
below the various departments of the banks, etc. Hierarchy or, what is the same, dis-
crete scale invariance, be it structurally built-in or dynamically generated, has been
recognized as the key ingredient to obtain log-periodic behavior [4, 7]. As expected,
the solution of the model indeed shows the existence of a critical point which can
be identified as the crash and of well-defined precursory and aftershock log-periodic
patterns. Although the model is rather ad-hoc, these results make more plausible our
above observation of a qualitative symmetry in the critical behavior of the market
before and after the crash. This model analyzes a situation of pure speculation, based
on the tendency for traders to imitate each others. When a series of buy orders, say,
are issued, an acceleration of demand results, which is self-strengthening. This ac-
celeration cannot be sustained indefinitely and, at some threshold, a crash ends this
sequence.
To sum up, the acceleration described by a power law is the signature of a critical
point. The log-periodic oscillations are the signature of discrete scale invariance in
the trading structure given above. There are several mechanisms that can generate
this remarkable structure; for instance a built-in hierarchical structure or irreversible
non-linear intermittent dynamics are know to generate these patterns [4, 7].
It is intriguing that the log-periodic structures documented here bear some simi-
larity with the ‘Elliott waves’ of technical analysis [15]. Technical analysis in finance
can be broadly defined as the study of financial markets, mainly using graphs of
stock prices as a function of time, in the goal of predicting future trends. A lot
of efforts has been developed in finance both by academic and trading institutions
and more recently by physicists (using some of their statistical tools developed to
deal with complex times series) to analyse past data to get informations on the fu-
ture. The ’Elliott wave’ technique is probably the most famous in this field. It has
been introduced in the 1930’s, based on observations on the human (trader) psychol-
ogy on one hand and from analogies with the mathematical theory of numbers and
more precisely the theory of Fibonacci numbers on the other hand. It describes the
time series of a stock price as made of different ”waves”. These different waves are
in relation with each others through the Fibonacci series Fn+2 = Fn+1 + Fn (with
F0 = F1 = 1). It is easy to show that
Fn+1
Fn
converges to a constant (the so-called
golden mean g ≃ 1.618), implying an approximate geometrical series of time scales
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Fn+1 ≃ gFn in the underlying waves, compatible with our above estimate for the
ratio λ ≃ 1.5− 1.7. We speculate that the ‘Elliott waves’, so strongly rooted in the
financial analysts’ folklore, could be a signature of an underlying critical structure of
the stockmarket.
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Figure captions
• Fig.1 : evolution as a function of time of the New York stock exchange index
S&P500 from July 1985 to the end of 1987 (557 trading days). The + represent
a constant return increase of ≈ 30%/year and had var (Fexp) ≈ 113. The best
fit to a power-law gives A1 ≈ 327, B1 ≈ −79, tc ≈ 87.65, m1 ≈ 0.7 and
varpow ≈ 107. The best fit to eq.(2) gives A2 ≈ 412, B2 ≈ −165, tc ≈ 87.74,
C ≈ 12, ω ≈ 7.4, T = 2.0, m2 ≈ 0.33 and varlp ≈ 36. One can observe
four well-defined oscillations fitted by eq.(2), before finite size effects limit the
theoretical divergence of the acceleration, at which point the bubble ends in
the crash. All the fits are carried over the whole time interval shown, up to
87.6. The fit with eq.(2) turns out to be very robust with respect to this upper
bound which can be varied significantly.
• Fig.2 : Time evolution of the implied variance in log-scale of the S&P500 index
after the crash, taken from [11]. The + represent an exponential decrease with
var (Fexp) ≈ 15. The best fit to a power-law, represented by the monotonic
line, gives A1 ≈ 3.9, B1 ≈ 0.6, tc = 87.75, m1 ≈ 1.5 and varpow ≈ 12. The best
fit to eq.(2) with tc − t replaced by t− tc gives A2 ≈ 3.4, B2 ≈ 0.9, tc ≈ 87.77,
C ≈ 0.3, ω ≈ 11, m2 ≈ −1.2 and varlp ≈ 7. One can observe six well-defined
oscillations fitted by eq.(2).
• Fig.3 : Time evolution of the S&P500 index over a time window of a few weeks
after the October 19 crash. The fit with an exponentially decaying sinusoidal
function suggests that a good model for the short-time response of the US
market is a single dissipative harmonic oscillator.
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